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Chapters0/54 ▾
  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Vulnerability Scanning Methods

Chapter 5 · Lesson 3 of 5

Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between

1 min read

A scan result describes a path, not only a host. An external scan from the internet measures the attack surface an outside attacker can reach today. An internal scan from the same subnet measures what an insider, or an attacker who has already bypassed the perimeter, would find.

When a firewall allows only HTTPS inbound, the external scan reporting one service and the internal scan reporting three are both correct, and filtering is the expected reason they differ. The exam wants you to keep both views rather than call one of them a false result.

The same logic explains many empty reports. An access list between a core scanner and a branch segment drops the probes, and every branch host looks closed even though staff use file and print services on them all day.

An inline prevention system may classify the scanner as an attacker halfway through a run and block it, leaving the rest of the hosts marked unreachable. In both cases the silence measures the network device, not the hosts.

  • Fix a filtered path by placing a scanner inside the segment or by an agreed exception for the scanner's traffic.
  • Record a truncated run as partial and repeat it; do not turn prevention off across the whole estate.
  • Raising the scan rate to beat the prevention system, or reading a blocked segment as hardened, are classic wrong answers.

Check yourself

1. A perimeter firewall permits only tcp/443 to a web server, which also listens internally on tcp/22 and tcp/1433. A scanner on the server's own subnet reports all three services; a scanner hosted outside the network reports only the HTTPS service. Which conclusion is correct?

2. A scanner in the datacenter core reports every host in a remote branch segment as having no open ports and no findings, although staff there use file and print services on those hosts all day. What is the most likely explanation, and the correct fix?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA: CySA+ (CS0-004) certification and exam objectives, NIST SP 800-115: Technical Guide to Information Security Testing and Assessment

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →