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Chapters0/54 ▾
  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting

Chapter 3 · Lesson 4 of 5

Judging and sharing threat intelligence

1 min read

Intelligence is worth acting on when it can change something in your environment. If a report describes an intrusion that entered through an appliance you do not own but then abused an identity provider and a cloud storage service you do use, the later steps are the actionable part: turn them into detections and configuration checks.

  • Durability: addresses, domains and hashes are cheap for an adversary to change, while a working persistence routine is costly to rebuild. This ordering is the idea behind the Pyramid of Pain, so behavior-based detections last longest.
  • Tooling artifacts: one identical self-signed certificate fingerprint seen across unrelated hosts ties them to one toolkit and is a stronger pivot than any single address.
  • Confidence and timeliness: a single-source, low-confidence, months-old entry on shared hosting space is a hunting lead, not a reason to block or declare an incident.
  • Sharing: send adversary infrastructure and technique descriptions, strip internal hostnames and personal details, and state redistribution limits.

Check yourself

1. An intelligence report lists 40 addresses, 12 domains, 3 file hashes and one described behavior: a signed scripting host creating a scheduled task named to resemble a vendor update job. Six weeks later 38 of the addresses no longer answer and all 3 hashes have changed. Which element still carries detection value, and why?

2. A sector report describes an intrusion set: initial access through a flaw in one vendor's remote-access appliance, then abuse of the victim's identity provider to mint long-lived tokens, then staging in a cloud storage service. It lists 60 addresses and 8 hashes. The reading organization runs a different appliance vendor but the same identity provider and storage service. What makes this report actionable there?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA CySA+ (CS0-004) certification page and exam objectives, MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →