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  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting

Chapter 3 · Lesson 2 of 5

Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes

1 min read

Questions about what happened on a host need host data. Process ancestry and command lines exist only in endpoint detection and response telemetry, which records each process with its parent and arguments. No SIEM rule built on firewall, proxy and authentication logs can rebuild a parent-child chain, because those sources never knew which process made a connection.

  • Hash reputation answers one question: has anyone seen this exact file before? Attackers rebuild payloads per target, so not found is normal for new malware and is never a clean verdict.
  • Static inspection cannot see behavior a macro builds at runtime, so detonate the file in an isolated, instrumented sandbox.
  • A quiet sandbox run is not proof of safety. Strings naming virtualization drivers, checks for user documents and long sleep calls mean the sample is evading, so run longer in a realistic environment.
  • An encoded PowerShell argument is obfuscation, not encryption. Decode the base64 offline to read the script without running anything.

Example: a binary dropped 20 minutes ago by a process the agent flagged returns not found from a reputation service. The right sequence is to keep the host under investigation, review the lineage that wrote the file, then analyze it statically and in a sandbox.

Submitting the signed interpreter that ran a script to a reputation service tells you nothing, because the interpreter itself is legitimate.

Check yourself

1. An analyst submits the SHA-256 digest of a suspicious executable to a file-reputation service, which answers 'not found'. The binary was written to disk an hour earlier by a process the endpoint agent had flagged as unusual. How should the 'not found' result be read?

2. An endpoint agent records this command line on a workstation: powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoA... , and the parent process is a mail client. Which step establishes the intent of this execution fastest?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA CySA+ (CS0-004) certification page and exam objectives, MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →