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Chapters0/54 ▾
  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Architecture & Log Sources

Chapter 1 · Lesson 1 of 5

What each log source can and cannot prove

1 min read

Every log is written from one vantage point, and it can only contain what that vantage point could observe. A network device sees packets, so it can record addresses, ports, byte counts and timing.

It never sees which program on the host opened the socket or which person was signed in. The exam builds many questions on this gap: an answer that claims a network record names a user or a process is almost always wrong.

SourceWhat it recordsWhat it cannot tell you
Flow recordsHosts, ports, protocol, bytes, durationUser, process or payload
Firewall without a proxyAllowed or denied connectionsFull URLs requested
DNS resolver logNames queried and answersThe page path or the requesting program
Endpoint agentProcess, parent, command line, logon session, socketsHosts where it is not installed

Shared identities create the same problem one layer up. If a web application connects to its database through one pooled service account, the database audit log proves what statement ran and when, but only the application's own session log can say which end user triggered it. Example: a sensor shows 2 GB leaving a terminal server used by 15 people.

The flow proves the volume and the destination; the endpoint agent's process and logon data is what ties it to one account.

Check yourself

1. A network sensor logs a TLS session from a workstation to a suspicious host: server name indication, certificate details, byte counts and duration, with no payload visible. The analyst must determine which executable on the workstation opened that connection. What is the best source?

2. Flow records from a core router show 4.2 GB transferred from a file server to an external address over forty minutes on TCP 443. Management asks which employee account moved the data. What do the flow records establish, and which source answers the question?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA CySA+ (CS0-004) certification page and exam objectives, NIST SP 800-92, Guide to Computer Security Log Management

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →