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  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Incident Response Techniques

Chapter 9 · Lesson 3 of 5

Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold

1 min read

Evidence only helps if someone can later show it was not altered. The defensible pattern for a drive is to attach it through a write blocker, take a bit-for-bit image, record a hash such as SHA-256, and examine only the verified copy.

Booting the machine or exporting a few folders changes timestamps and misses unallocated space. If the hash of a working copy does not match the hash recorded at acquisition, stop, document the mismatch and make the copy again. Hashing the bad copy with a second algorithm only gives another value for the wrong data.

Chain of custody is a written, unbroken record of who held the evidence, when and why. A handoff between shifts is logged and signed by both people at the moment it happens; a later email or ticket note cannot prove who held the drive in between.

Responders also keep a running log of every command and change they make, so the report can separate their actions from the intruder's. If someone already ran a cleanup tool before imaging, record who did it and when, and state the evidence gap in the findings.

Example: counsel places a legal hold on a departing manager's laptop that is booked for reimaging this afternoon. The hold overrides the operational schedule, so the device and its image are preserved and the rebuild waits until counsel releases it.

Check yourself

1. An analyst records the SHA-256 value of a disk image at acquisition, copies the image to an analysis workstation, and hashes it again. The two values differ. What should the analyst do?

2. A laptop may become evidence in a dismissal case that the company expects to be challenged. The analyst is about to acquire its drive. Which set of practices keeps the work defensible?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA: CySA+ (CS0-004) certification and exam objectives, IETF RFC 3227: Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →