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  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting

Chapter 3 · Lesson 5 of 5

Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection

1 min read

Threat hunting is proactive: it starts from a hypothesis about adversary behavior that no existing rule covers. Alert triage is reactive: it starts from alerts that rules already raised. Moving hunters onto the alert queue does not just delay a backlog; it stops the only work that finds detection gaps.

  • Hypothesis: name a specific behavior, the telemetry that would carry it and the observable evidence, so the hunt can end in a defensible yes or no. Look for anything unusual is not a hypothesis.
  • Negative results: finding nothing supports only the claim that the behavior is absent from the covered hosts for the retained period. Name the gaps.
  • Lasting value: turn what was found into an automated detection, tune it against normal activity and confirm it fires on a replayed example.

Example: an endpoint agent covers 340 of 400 workstations, 85 percent, and keeps 60 days. A clean hunt says nothing about the other 60 machines or about day 61 and earlier.

Write the result with that scope, record the coverage gap as a finding, and do not mark the hypothesis disproven for the whole estate. Repeating the same manual query every month, or blocking the file hashes a hunt uncovered, is weaker than an automated behavior detection.

Check yourself

1. A hunt is proposed as: 'look through DNS logs for anything unusual'. The hunt lead asks for it to be restated so that the result can be judged either way. Which restatement is a usable hypothesis?

2. A hunt for a registry-based persistence technique searches 90 days of endpoint telemetry and finds nothing. The endpoint agent is installed on 82 percent of workstations and does record writes to the registry keys in question. What does the negative result legitimately support?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA CySA+ (CS0-004) certification page and exam objectives, MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →