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Chapters0/54 ▾
  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Incident Response Techniques

Chapter 9 · Lesson 2 of 5

Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access

1 min read

RFC 3227 sets the principle the exam uses: collect the most perishable evidence first. Live state, such as memory, the running process list, the ARP cache and open network connections, disappears the moment the host restarts or loses power.

Disk contents survive a restart, and logs already shipped to a central server or backups on separate media are safest of all, so they come last.

Example: a responder has five minutes before a forced restart and can take either the active connection table or a full disk image. The connection table comes first, because the disk will still be there afterward.

The same logic means a service desk request to reboot an infected workstation, or to run a cleanup tool on it, waits until memory and live state are captured.

  • Never sign in interactively with a domain administrator account on a suspect host; the credential lands in memory the intruder may control. Use a scoped account or remote agent collection.
  • For a cloud virtual machine, snapshot the volume, move it to an isolating security group, and revoke the attached role's sessions instead of terminating it.
  • For a container that is already gone, evidence lives outside it: control-plane audit records, shipped logs, and the image with its registry history.

Check yourself

1. A responder has ten minutes on a live compromised host before a maintenance window forces a restart. Available items are the ARP cache and active connection table, a full disk image, the archived authentication logs on the log server, and last night's backup tape. Which does the responder collect first, and why?

2. A cloud virtual machine is confirmed compromised. It has an attached identity role that grants access to storage, and the team needs containment that keeps the evidence available. Which set of actions is best?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA: CySA+ (CS0-004) certification and exam objectives, IETF RFC 3227: Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →