Quibank app: now on the App Store — free, works offline. Get the app ↗

Chapters0/54 ▾
  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
Saved in this browser. Move it to another device →
← Architecture & Log Sources

Chapter 1 · Lesson 4 of 5

Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines

1 min read

Modern infrastructure moves evidence away from disks you can image. In a cloud account, actions against resources such as deleting storage objects are authenticated API calls, so the provider's API audit trail is the record of who called what, from where and when.

For object-level operations like reads and deletes inside a bucket, that logging usually has to be enabled in advance. Virtual network flow logs cannot see the identity inside an encrypted API session, and a virtual machine's guest log only shows what that one machine did through its own mount.

  • Containers: images are immutable and runtime writes live in a disposable writable layer, so once the orchestrator replaces an instance only telemetry streamed out while it ran remains.
  • Serverless: there is no host and no disk to acquire, so work from the platform's invocation records and the function's own logs, which must be configured in advance.
  • Virtualization: if a guest may hold a rootkit, the hypervisor's virtual switch traffic and management actions are evidence the guest cannot edit, though they do not replace in-guest process detail.

Example: a container ran for 6 minutes before the orchestrator recycled it. Whatever it wrote locally is gone; the question becomes whether its logs and file-integrity events were forwarded during those 6 minutes. Rebuilding or replaying a workload produces a reconstruction, not evidence of the original event.

Check yourself

1. An alert names a suspicious file written inside a container. By the time the analyst looks, the orchestrator has already replaced that container with a fresh instance from the same image. What is the accurate position on the evidence?

2. Objects in a cloud storage bucket were deleted over a weekend. Available sources include the guest logs of a virtual machine that mounted the bucket, virtual network flow logs, and the provider's audit trail. Which source names the identity that issued the delete calls?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA CySA+ (CS0-004) certification page and exam objectives, NIST SP 800-92, Guide to Computer Security Log Management

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →