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  1. 1.Architecture & Log Sources0/5
    1. What each log source can and cannot prove
    2. Time synchronization and log normalization
    3. Sensor placement, logging levels and retention
    4. Cloud, containers, serverless and virtual machines
    5. Identity, directory and federation logs
  2. 2.Indicators of Malicious Activity0/5
    1. Network indicators: DNS abuse, odd protocols and unusual volume
    2. Host indicators: process lineage, masquerading and built-in tools
    3. Persistence and anti-forensics on hosts
    4. Identity and application indicators
    5. Cloud indicators: stolen keys and disabled audit trails
  3. 3.Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting0/5
    1. Packet capture, flow data and network monitoring sensors
    2. Endpoint telemetry, file reputation and sandboxes
    3. SIEM correlation rules and email header analysis
    4. Judging and sharing threat intelligence
    5. Running a threat hunt from hypothesis to detection
  4. 4.Process Improvement, Automation & AI0/5
    1. Choosing what to automate in the SOC
    2. Standard processes: playbooks, runbooks and the case record
    3. Integrations, alert tuning and measuring improvement
    4. AI in security operations: good uses and main risks
    5. AI governance: accountability, audit trails and validation
  5. 5.Vulnerability Scanning Methods0/5
    1. Asset inventory, discovery scans and scan scope
    2. Credentialed, non-credentialed and agent-based scanning
    3. Scanner placement: internal, external and what sits in between
    4. Passive scanning, fragile devices and scan scheduling
    5. Web applications, containers, infrastructure-as-code and baselines
  6. 6.Analyzing Scan Output0/5
    1. Validating findings and spotting false positives
    2. False negatives, failed credentials and stale plugin feeds
    3. Present, reachable, mitigated or already compromised
    4. Reading the kind of finding: patch, configuration, end of life or shared source
    5. Consolidating and deduplicating findings
  7. 7.Prioritization, Mitigation & Controls0/5
    1. Severity scores versus risk, and how CVSS v4.0 is organized
    2. Risk-based prioritization: exploitation, exposure and business context
    3. Remediation paths, change control and verifying the fix
    4. Compensating controls, exceptions, acceptance and transfer
    5. Classifying controls by type and by function
  8. 8.Attack Frameworks & the Response Process0/5
    1. Three attack frameworks, three different questions
    2. Using MITRE ATT&CK: tactics, techniques and procedures
    3. The Cyber Kill Chain: stages and where to break them
    4. The incident response lifecycle, old and new framing
    5. Containment, eradication, recovery and post-incident activity
  9. 9.Incident Response Techniques0/5
    1. Triage and scoping an incident
    2. Collecting evidence: order of volatility and safe access
    3. Integrity, chain of custody and legal hold
    4. Containment techniques that keep the evidence
    5. Eradication, recovery and root cause
  10. 10.Vulnerability Reporting & Communication0/5
    1. From raw scan export to an actionable finding
    2. Matching the report to the audience
    3. Metrics that show direction: trends, aging, recurrence and coverage
    4. Risk acceptance, exceptions, action plans and escalation
    5. Credibility: honest severity, controlled disclosure and AI-drafted reports
  11. 11.Incident Reporting & Metrics0/4
    1. Writing a defensible incident record
    2. Communicating while the incident is live
    3. After-action reports, root cause and lessons learned
    4. Response metrics and how they mislead
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← Incident Response Techniques

Chapter 9 · Lesson 1 of 5

Triage and scoping an incident

1 min read

When several alerts arrive at once, the exam expects you to rank them by two questions: how likely is this to be real, and what would it cost if it is? Behavioral detections on critical systems, such as a credential theft tool running on a domain controller, outrank a confirmed but low-impact finding like adware on a kiosk.

A signature that cannot apply to the target, such as a Linux exploit fired against a Windows-only host, is close to a certain false positive.

Scope is not the host where the problem was first seen. It follows the evidence. If attacker tooling contains a service account password, every system and scheduled job that accepts that credential is in scope until cleared, and the lack of a logged sign-in may only mean logging was incomplete.

If proxy logs show other hosts contacting the same beacon domain, those hosts are in scope too.

Example: one laptop is isolated after it beacons to a suspicious domain, and a proxy search shows two more machines in another office calling the same domain during the same week.

The incident is not contained until those two are found and isolated or cleared. Blocking the domain at the proxy cuts one channel but leaves any foothold on those machines in place.

Check yourself

1. Attacker tooling recovered from one server contains the plaintext password of a service account used by several automated jobs. The manager asks how far the incident scope now reaches. Which statement is correct?

2. One host has been isolated and its malware removed. Proxy logs show the same beacon domain contacted from four hosts in three other subnets during the same period. The manager wants the incident declared contained. What is the correct position?

Facts checked 2026-11-15 · Sources: CompTIA: CySA+ (CS0-004) certification and exam objectives, IETF RFC 3227: Guidelines for Evidence Collection and Archiving

CompTIA CySA+ cheat sheet: every key fact on one page →