27 Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting Practice Questions & Answers
Every Investigation Tools & Threat Hunting practice question from the CompTIA CySA+ Practice Test, with the correct answer and a short explanation.
Start practice test →1. A security operations center retains 7 days of full packet capture and 12 months of flow records. An investigation opens into traffic from 30 days ago, when an internal workstation exchanged data with an external address later identified as a command-and-control host. What can the analyst still establish from the surviving data?
- A.That the sessions occurred and, from the flow records, which files were transferred, since flow summarizes each payload it observes.
- B.That the sessions occurred, with times, duration, ports and byte counts, but not their content, since flow keeps no payload.✓ Answer
- C.Nothing useful, because flow records are discarded whenever the matching packet capture ages out of the retention window.
- D.The full request and response bodies, because flow records store the first bytes of every session for exactly this purpose.
Flow (session-summary) records keep metadata — addresses, ports, timestamps, duration and byte counts — and by design discard payload, so once the capture window has aged out the analyst can prove that the conversation happened and when, but can never recover what was sent. That asymmetry is why full capture is kept for days at high cost while flow is kept for months cheaply.
Ref QB-PJBH5DSource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (packet capture vs. flow/session analysis); RFC 7011 (IPFIX) — flow records describe traffic metadata, not payloadReport a problem with this question
2. A user forwards a document attachment that the mail gateway delivered. Static inspection shows one macro that builds a long Base64 string at runtime, no readable URLs or domains, and a file digest that no reputation source recognizes. What is the appropriate next step and why?
- A.Detonate the document in an isolated instrumented environment, because the behavior it builds at runtime is visible only on execution.✓ Answer
- B.Upload the document to a public multi-engine scanner, because an unrecognized digest simply means the file must be added to those engines.
- C.Close it as benign, because the mail gateway already delivered it and no reputation source flags the digest as malicious.
- D.Push the digest to the endpoint fleet as a blocking indicator, because that neutralizes the sample without the cost of any further analysis.
Static inspection cannot see behavior that a sample assembles only at execution time, so a document whose macro builds its payload at runtime has to be executed under observation — in an isolated, instrumented environment — to reveal the processes, files and network destinations it uses. An unrecognized digest means only that nobody has submitted that file before, and a gateway pass is not a verdict.
Ref QB-83VZVESource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (static analysis vs. dynamic/sandbox detonation)Report a problem with this question
3. Only firewall, proxy and authentication logs are forwarded to the SIEM. An analyst must determine whether a spreadsheet application on one workstation started a scripting interpreter, and what that interpreter started in turn. Which source answers the question?
- A.A SIEM correlation rule joining proxy and authentication events, which reconstructs the missing parent-child chain by timing.
- B.A perimeter packet capture filtered to that workstation's address, which shows the interpreter's own image name in the session.
- C.The endpoint agent's own process telemetry on that host, which records each process with its parent and its command line.✓ Answer
- D.The proxy log entries for that workstation, which name the process that opened each outbound request alongside the URL.
Process ancestry and command lines exist only in host-level telemetry: an endpoint agent records each process creation with its parent and arguments, which is exactly the question being asked. Network, proxy and authentication records describe connections and logons and never carry which process on the host initiated them, so no correlation rule over those sources can reconstruct a parent-child chain.
Ref QB-QJPUAESource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (endpoint detection and response telemetry vs. network and log sources)Report a problem with this question
4. An analyst writes a SIEM correlation rule: alert when one account authenticates successfully from two different countries within one hour. It now fires several hundred times a day, almost all on staff whose sessions egress through a cloud access gateway in another country and whose phones use foreign carrier addresses. What does this illustrate about correlation rules?
- A.A rule of this kind cannot be written at all, because an account's country is derived data and no correlation engine may key on a derived field.
- B.The logic is sound and the fix is simply a longer window, since widening the interval removes the coincidences that are creating the noise.
- C.It needs local context such as known egress ranges, because a rule expresses co-occurrence inside a window but not legitimacy.✓ Answer
- D.Correlation is the wrong construct here, because sequence and timing belong only to signature matching performed on raw network traffic.
A correlation rule can express relationships between events — co-occurrence, ordering and thresholds inside a time window — but it has no concept of whether the relationship is legitimate, so fidelity comes from enriching it with knowledge of this environment, such as the organization's own gateway egress ranges and expected carrier space. Widening the window would make the same rule match more pairs, not fewer.
Ref QB-938C3GSource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (SIEM correlation and analysis; context enrichment for alert fidelity)Report a problem with this question
5. An analyst submits the SHA-256 digest of a suspicious executable to a file-reputation service, which answers 'not found'. The binary was written to disk an hour earlier by a process the endpoint agent had flagged as unusual. How should the 'not found' result be read?
- A.The file has been assessed as clean by a very large corpus, so the host can be released to the user and the ticket can be closed.
- B.No sample with that digest has been submitted before, which is expected for freshly built binaries, so local analysis must continue.✓ Answer
- C.The service indexes a different digest algorithm, so recomputing the file's MD5 value returns the verdict that is genuinely held on it.
- D.The file is packed, and because packing changes a digest it must be unpacked before any reputation service can return a verdict.
A reputation lookup answers only one question: has anyone seen this exact byte sequence before. Absence is therefore not a clean verdict — attackers routinely recompile or pad a payload per target so that its digest is unique — and the correct move is local static and dynamic analysis together with the process lineage that wrote the file.
Ref QB-RJ27GFSource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (hashing utilities and file reputation analysis; limits of digest-based verdicts)Report a problem with this question
6. A credential-phishing message reached three mailboxes, and the analyst wants to identify the infrastructure that actually delivered it in order to search for other recipients. The message carries a From display name matching an executive, a Reply-To at a free mail provider, an X-Originating-IP header, and a Received chain of five hops. Which element is the most reliable pivot?
- A.The X-Originating-IP header, since the sending client inserts its own true address there before the message leaves the network.
- B.The Reply-To address, since replies must reach the operator and therefore resolve to the infrastructure that delivered the message.
- C.The From display name, since gateways rewrite that field to the verified sending domain once authentication checks have completed.
- D.The Received hop written by the organization's own inbound gateway, since hops added upstream of it are supplied by the sender.✓ Answer
Each receiving mail transfer agent prepends its own Received trace field, so the newest hop sits on top and the chain is trustworthy only from the top down to your own gateway's hop; every hop below it, along with From, Reply-To and any X- header, is text the sender chose and can forge. The gateway's own hop therefore gives the address that genuinely delivered the message, which is the field to pivot on across the mail store.
Ref QB-A3KP8HSource: RFC 5321 §4.4 (trace information: Received fields prepended by each receiving MTA); CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (email header analysis)Report a problem with this question
7. A 4 GB packet capture was taken at a core switch's mirror port. The team must determine whether an internal application still transmits account credentials in the clear to a legacy service on TCP 23. Which technique answers that question?
- A.Compute the capture file's digest and submit it to a reputation service to see whether this traffic is already known to be hostile.
- B.Replay the capture through a signature-based sensor and treat the absence of any rule match as proof that the transport is encrypted.
- C.Read the router's flow records for the same period and compare the byte count of each session against the size that is expected.
- D.Open the capture in a protocol analyser, filter to TCP 23 and follow the stream to read the bytes the two hosts exchanged.✓ Answer
Only full packet capture holds payload, and a protocol analyser can filter to the port and reassemble the application stream so the credential exchange is read exactly as it crossed the wire. Flow byte counts and signature hits describe that sessions existed or matched a rule, but neither can show which characters were transmitted, so neither can confirm or rule out cleartext authentication.
Ref QB-SJDHNGSource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (packet capture and protocol analysis: stream reassembly)Report a problem with this question
8. A sample detonated in an automated analysis environment exits after two minutes with no files written and no network connections. Static strings from the same binary include names of virtualization drivers, a check for installed office documents, and a long sleep call. What is the best conclusion and next action?
- A.The sample likely spotted the sandbox, since it checks for VM drivers and stalls; extend the run and add realistic host artifacts.✓ Answer
- B.The static strings are a false lead, since compilers embed driver names routinely; submit the binary to more analysis services instead.
- C.The environment failed; rebuild it and replay the same two-minute run, because evasion checks cannot survive a clean rebuild of the host.
- D.The sample is inert; record it as benign and add its digest to the environment's allowlist so that future runs are not repeated.
Sandbox-aware malware looks for virtualization artifacts, an implausibly empty user profile or a short observation window and simply sleeps through it, so silence in an instrumented run is not evidence that a sample is harmless; the strings recovered here are precisely those checks. The analysis environment has to be given more time and made to look and behave like a used workstation before any verdict is recorded.
Ref QB-334C29Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (dynamic analysis and sandbox-evasion behaviour)Report a problem with this question
9. An endpoint agent records this command line on a workstation: powershell.exe -nop -w hidden -enc SQBFAFgAIAAoAE4AZQB3AC0ATwBiAGoA... , and the parent process is a mail client. Which step establishes the intent of this execution fastest?
- A.Decode the Base64 argument offline and read the script, since the decoded text names the objects and addresses it would contact.✓ Answer
- B.Search the encoded string itself against indicator feeds, since an encoded argument is the durable artifact that defenders exchange.
- C.Run the whole command line on a spare workstation and watch the console output, since the script prints whatever it is fetching.
- D.Submit powershell.exe itself to a reputation service, since a verdict on the interpreter establishes whether this run was hostile.
An encoded command argument is obfuscation, not encryption: decoding the Base64 to text offline reconstructs the script and immediately exposes the destinations and actions it would perform, with nothing executed. The blob itself changes with every build so it is a poor indicator, and the interpreter is a legitimate signed system binary, which is why this living-off-the-land pattern must be judged on parent process and command line rather than on file reputation.
Ref QB-JJW6F8Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (decoding obfuscated payloads; abuse of living-off-the-land binaries)Report a problem with this question
10. A hunt team needs, for every connection on a monitored segment over the last month, a record of protocol, duration, bytes and the server name requested in each TLS handshake. Storing payload for a month is not affordable. Which monitoring approach meets the requirement?
- A.A signature-based sensor on the same span, whose alert records already describe every connection the segment carried during the month.
- B.The routers' flow records, which list the server name from each handshake alongside the addresses, ports and byte counts per session.
- C.A passive sensor that parses traffic and writes per-connection protocol metadata logs, including handshake fields, but keeps no payload.✓ Answer
- D.Full packet capture kept for a month at reduced resolution, by truncating every packet to its first bytes and discarding the remainder.
A network-security-monitoring sensor parses live traffic and writes one compact protocol log per connection, including application-layer fields such as the requested server name, which is what makes a month of searchable history possible without storing payload. Signature sensors log only rule matches, and router flow records carry the five-tuple, timing and counts but no application-layer content at all.
Ref QB-VCD535Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3 (network security monitoring: protocol metadata logging vs. signature IDS vs. flow data)Report a problem with this question
11. Six workstations in different departments each opened outbound TLS sessions to different external addresses. In every session the server presented a self-signed certificate with the same fingerprint, an issuer string of 'localhost' and a two-year validity. What does this support, and how should the analyst pivot?
- A.Six unrelated misconfigured internal services are being reached; correct each certificate and no further investigation is warranted here.
- B.The sessions cannot be assessed without decryption; deploy inspection on the egress path before drawing any conclusion from them.
- C.One toolkit is in use across the six hosts; hunt on the certificate fingerprint to find further sessions and additional addresses.✓ Answer
- D.The addresses are the durable artifact here; block all six at the perimeter and treat the certificate detail as incidental noise.
A server certificate fingerprint is an artifact of the attacker's own tooling, so one identical self-signed certificate appearing across unrelated hosts and unrelated addresses ties those sessions to a single toolkit. That makes the fingerprint a far stronger pivot than any one address, which an operator can rotate in minutes, and it can be hunted historically without decrypting anything.
Ref QB-DVJAN5Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.3–1.4 (certificate and host artefacts as investigative pivots; Pyramid of Pain — tooling artefacts outrank addresses)Report a problem with this question
12. A sector report describes an intrusion set: initial access through a flaw in one vendor's remote-access appliance, then abuse of the victim's identity provider to mint long-lived tokens, then staging in a cloud storage service. It lists 60 addresses and 8 hashes. The reading organization runs a different appliance vendor but the same identity provider and storage service. What makes this report actionable there?
- A.The identity and storage steps map to technology in use, so those behaviors can become local detections and configuration checks.✓ Answer
- B.None of it applies, because the remote-access appliance named as the entry point is not deployed anywhere in this environment.
- C.All of it applies equally, because an intrusion-set report describes an adversary rather than the particular products a victim ran.
- D.The 60 addresses and 8 hashes are the actionable part, so blocking every one of them is the step that matters most on receipt.
Intelligence becomes actionable when it can change something in this environment, so the reported steps that touch technology actually deployed — token issuance abuse at the identity provider and staging in the cloud storage service — can be converted into detections, hunts and configuration checks. Indicators tied to an appliance nobody runs are context worth reading, not work worth doing, and a bulk block of stale addresses is effort without coverage.
Ref QB-WCRF86Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (threat intelligence properties: relevance and applicability to the environment)Report a problem with this question
13. An intelligence report lists 40 addresses, 12 domains, 3 file hashes and one described behavior: a signed scripting host creating a scheduled task named to resemble a vendor update job. Six weeks later 38 of the addresses no longer answer and all 3 hashes have changed. Which element still carries detection value, and why?
- A.The addresses the report lists, because infrastructure reuse between campaigns makes address lists the most durable content of such reports.
- B.The file hashes the report lists, because a compiled payload must stay byte-identical for the campaign's own loader to run it on each victim.
- C.The domain names the report lists, because registration and certificate costs make a domain the hardest artifact to replace at short notice.
- D.The behavior the report describes, because rebuilding a working persistence routine costs an adversary far more than rotating infrastructure.✓ Answer
Addresses, domains and file hashes are cheap for an adversary to rotate, which is why they expire quickly, whereas a working persistence routine represents engineering effort and operator habit, so a detection written on that behavior keeps firing after the infrastructure and the binaries change. This ordering of artifact durability, from trivially changed indicators up to tactics and techniques, is the whole point of the Pyramid of Pain.
Ref QB-EVWMT6Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (indicator durability); Pyramid of Pain (D. Bianco) — TTPs are the costliest artefacts for an adversary to changeReport a problem with this question
14. A single-source feed entry marks an address as active command-and-control, with low confidence and a first-seen date nine months old. The address belongs to a shared range at a large hosting provider, and the organization's own telemetry shows no connection to it in the retained period. An analyst proposes adding it to the perimeter deny list today. Which response is sound?
- A.Block it now, because a deny-list entry is cheap and reversible and a low-confidence indicator still outweighs an absent local sighting.
- B.Keep it as a low-priority hunting lead and as detection enrichment, because blocking a shared address on low confidence breaks legitimate services.✓ Answer
- C.Discard the entry entirely, because an item from a single source with low confidence has no place in any defensive workflow whatsoever.
- D.Escalate it as a confirmed incident, because a command-and-control label from any feed means at least one host in scope is already compromised.
Confidence and source reliability decide what an analyst does with a report, not merely whether it is filed: a single-source, low-confidence, nine-month-old entry on shared hosting space justifies enrichment and a retrospective hunt, while a perimeter block would also cut off every legitimate service sharing that address. The absence of any local sighting means nothing yet meets the bar for declaring an incident.
Ref QB-XC4TD7Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (intelligence confidence levels, source reliability and timeliness)Report a problem with this question
15. A team wants to share what it learned from an intrusion with a sector sharing community. The draft package contains the adversary's domains and a persistence technique description, and also internal hostnames, the affected employee's mailbox address and a link to the internal ticket. What is the right handling?
- A.Share the package unchanged, because recipients need the raw material to judge it and can be trusted to discard the internal parts.
- B.Share adversary artifacts and technique under redistribution limits, without internal or personal identifiers, since peers need only those.✓ Answer
- C.Share nothing until the intrusion is publicly disclosed, because any early release creates liability that outweighs the defensive benefit.
- D.Share only the domains, because a technique description is proprietary detection logic that a sharing community has no legitimate use for.
Sharing is useful only when the recipient receives adversary-attributable content — infrastructure and, above all, behavior others can detect — and it is safe only when victim and internal detail is removed and handling and redistribution expectations are attached. Sanitizing the package therefore satisfies both, whereas dumping it raw exposes the organization and its employee and withholding it forfeits the defensive value.
Ref QB-FV9YY7Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (information sharing and collaboration; handling and redistribution designations)Report a problem with this question
16. A hunt is proposed as: 'look through DNS logs for anything unusual'. The hunt lead asks for it to be restated so that the result can be judged either way. Which restatement is a usable hypothesis?
- A.DNS is being abused somewhere in the estate; we would see it by reviewing every domain resolved during the period, one by one.
- B.An internal host is tunneling data over DNS; we would see sustained long, high-entropy labels sent to one registered domain.✓ Answer
- C.Some DNS answers are malicious; we would see it by alerting on every response that returns a name-error result to any internal client.
- D.The resolver is generating more traffic than it did last quarter; we would see it as a rise in total query volume across all clients.
A hunting hypothesis has to name a specific adversary behavior, the telemetry that would carry it and the observable evidence that would confirm or refute it, so that the search can end in a defensible yes or no. 'Anything unusual' and 'abused somewhere' cannot be refuted and therefore produce browsing, while a volume trend and an alert on name-error responses measure something other than the behavior in question.
Ref QB-YCF5K8Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (hypothesis-driven threat hunting; testing and documenting conclusions)Report a problem with this question
17. A hunt for a registry-based persistence technique searches 90 days of endpoint telemetry and finds nothing. The endpoint agent is installed on 82 percent of workstations and does record writes to the registry keys in question. What does the negative result legitimately support?
- A.That the hunt was wasted effort, since a hunt only creates value when it ends in a confirmed finding that an incident case can act on.
- B.That the environment is free of this persistence technique, so the hypothesis can be marked disproven and dropped from the hunt backlog.
- C.That the behavior is absent from the covered hosts for those 90 days, with the uncovered 18 percent and older activity still unknown.✓ Answer
- D.That the agent's registry recording is faulty, because a technique this common would otherwise appear somewhere in 90 days of telemetry.
A negative hunt result is bounded by visibility and retention: it supports the claim that the hunted behavior does not appear in the telemetry that exists, for the hosts covered and the period searched, and nothing more. The honest output is a documented scope with its gaps named — here the 18 percent of workstations without an agent and anything older than the retained 90 days — which is itself a useful finding about coverage.
Ref QB-GVMA69Source: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (documenting and testing hunt conclusions; visibility and coverage gaps)Report a problem with this question
18. A hunt finds three hosts on which a scripting interpreter loaded a library from a user-writable directory. The files are removed and the hosts are cleaned. What must happen for the hunt to leave lasting value?
- A.Turn the behavior into an automated detection, tune it on normal activity and test it on a replay, so that it keeps catching this.✓ Answer
- B.Schedule the same manual query to be repeated monthly, since a query that found something once is the durable control here.
- C.Add the three library digests to the blocking list, since that stops the same loads recurring on any host in the environment.
- D.Record the finding in the hunt report and in the incident case, since documenting the pattern in writing is what makes it reusable.
A hunt pays back when the behavior it uncovered becomes an automated detection that has been tuned against normal activity and validated to fire, because that removes the need to repeat the manual search and catches the next instance at the time it happens. File digests break as soon as the library is recompiled, and a monthly manual query leaves the environment blind between runs.
Ref QB-RCYSCYSource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (threat hunting outcomes: new detections and reduced attack surface)Report a problem with this question
19. During a busy week a manager reassigns the two hunters to the alert queue, on the grounds that both jobs are 'reading logs'. What is the accurate distinction, and what does the reassignment cost?
- A.Triage and hunting are the same activity at different volumes, so the only cost is that hunting resumes later than was planned.
- B.Hunting differs only in tooling, since hunters query the same console with the same saved searches, so nothing of substance is given up.
- C.Hunting is the escalation path for alerts that analysts cannot close, so the cost is longer handling times on the queue's hardest tickets.
- D.Triage starts from alerts an existing rule raised; hunting starts from a hypothesis about behavior no rule covers, so gap discovery stops.✓ Answer
Alert triage is reactive: the work arrives from rules that already exist, and each item has a defined path to closure. Hunting is proactive and hypothesis-driven, deliberately searching telemetry where no rule fires, so pausing it does not merely delay a queue — it suspends the only activity that finds the detection gaps, and those gaps stay open for as long as the hunters are on the queue.
Ref QB-9V5YXYSource: CompTIA CySA+ CS0-004 Obj. 1.4 (threat hunting as proactive, hypothesis-driven work distinct from alert-driven triage)Report a problem with this question
20. An EDR alert shows a signed system process opening outbound connections to an unfamiliar address, yet a scan of the disk finds no malicious file. Before isolating the host, the responder captured a full RAM image. Which tool should the analyst use on that image to list processes and look for injected code?
- A.Wireshark
- B.Nessus
- C.Volatility✓ Answer
- D.Metasploit
Volatility is a memory forensics framework. Its plugins parse a RAM image to list processes, process trees and network objects, and they flag memory regions that may hold injected code. That is where fileless malware lives when nothing is on disk. Wireshark decodes packet captures, Nessus scans live hosts for vulnerabilities, and Metasploit is an exploitation framework. None of them reads a memory image.
Ref QB-QMENV9Source: Volatility 3 documentation (volatility3.readthedocs.io): describes itself as 'the most advanced memory forensics framework'; windows.pslist/pstree plugins; windows.malfind 'Lists process memory ranges that potentially contain injected code'Report a problem with this question
21. An analyst runs an Nmap TCP scan against a file server from a workstation subnet and gets: PORT STATE SERVICE 22/tcp open ssh 445/tcp filtered microsoft-ds 3389/tcp closed ms-wbt-server What does the result for port 445 tell the analyst?
- A.The port answered the probes, but no application is listening on it.
- B.Packet filtering blocked the probes, so Nmap cannot tell if it is open.✓ Answer
- C.An application is listening and accepts connections from any subnet.
- D.A service is listening, but Nmap could not identify its exact version.
Nmap reports 'filtered' when packet filtering stops its probes from reaching the port, so it cannot decide whether the port is open. The filtering can come from a firewall, a router rule or a host firewall. 'Closed' is different: the port is reachable and responds, but nothing listens on it, which is what 3389 shows here. A failed version guess still leaves the port marked open.
Ref QB-759GA9Source: Nmap Reference Guide, 'Port Scanning Basics' (nmap.org/book/man-port-scanning-basics.html): definitions of the open, closed and filtered port statesReport a problem with this question
22. A web team reports that a checkout page stores the item price in a hidden form field. The analyst must confirm whether the server accepts an order after that price is changed between the browser and the server. Which tool fits this test?
- A.Nmap
- B.tcpdump
- C.Volatility
- D.OWASP ZAP✓ Answer
ZAP, like Burp Suite, works as an intercepting proxy between the tester's browser and the web application. It can catch a request, let the tester edit a parameter such as the hidden price, and forward it to see how the server responds. tcpdump can only record traffic and cannot change it in transit. Nmap finds open ports and services, and Volatility analyzes memory images.
Ref QB-RMSY2BSource: ZAP Getting Started guide (zaproxy.org/getting-started): ZAP is a 'manipulator-in-the-middle proxy' that can intercept, inspect and modify messages between browser and web applicationReport a problem with this question
23. A sensor runs this rule: alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET 80 (msg:"Shell command in HTTP"; content:"cmd.exe"; sid:1000010; rev:1;) An internal host sends an HTTP request to an external web server, and the request contains the text CMD.EXE. Does the rule alert?
- A.No, because content matches are case-sensitive unless nocase is added.✓ Answer
- B.No, because the -> operator matches only traffic arriving at $HOME_NET.
- C.Yes, because content matches ignore letter case unless told otherwise.
- D.Yes, because the rule header matches both directions of every session.
The header matches. With ->, the left side is the source and the right side is the destination, so an internal host sending to external port 80 is exactly the traffic it describes. The payload test fails, though, because Snort content matches are case-sensitive by default. Only the nocase modifier would let 'cmd.exe' match 'CMD.EXE'. Matching both directions requires the <> operator.
Ref QB-85MTFASource: Snort 3 Rule Writing Guide (docs.snort.org): 'nocase' page (content matches are case-sensitive by default); 'Direction Operators' page (-> means left is source, right is destination; <> is bidirectional)Report a problem with this question
24. A hunt team deploys this YARA rule: rule Sus_Loader { strings: $a = "VirtualAlloc" $b = "CreateRemoteThread" $c = "http://update-check" nocase condition: uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and 2 of ($a,$b,$c) } Which file does the rule match?
- A.A PE file that contains CreateRemoteThread twice and nothing else
- B.A PDF file that contains all three strings exactly as they are written
- C.A PE file that contains VirtualAlloc and HTTP://UPDATE-CHECK✓ Answer
- D.A PE file that contains virtualalloc and createremotethread in lowercase
uint16(0) == 0x5A4D requires the MZ header at offset 0, so only a PE file qualifies. '2 of ($a,$b,$c)' requires at least two different strings from the set. YARA text strings are case-sensitive unless marked nocase, so $c matches the uppercase URL, while lowercase 'virtualalloc' does not match $a. One string found twice still counts as one string, and a PDF lacks the MZ header.
Ref QB-SM5B8CSource: YARA documentation, 'Writing YARA rules' (yara.readthedocs.io): text strings are case-sensitive by default, nocase modifier; 'Sets of strings' (2 of ($a,$b,$c) requires at least two of the strings); IsPE example uint16(0) == 0x5A4DReport a problem with this question
25. During an investigation an analyst runs: tcpdump -i eth0 -w dns.pcap udp port 53 What does this command do?
- A.Reads the saved dns.pcap file and displays only the UDP port 53 packets
- B.Captures UDP port 53 traffic on eth0 and saves the raw packets to dns.pcap✓ Answer
- C.Captures all eth0 traffic to dns.pcap and shows only UDP 53 on the screen
- D.Captures UDP port 53 traffic on eth0 and writes a warning log to dns.pcap
-i sets the interface to listen on. -w writes the raw packets to a file instead of parsing and printing them, and the file can be read back later with -r. The trailing expression is a capture filter, so tcpdump dumps only the packets for which 'udp port 53' is true, not every packet on eth0. Reading a saved file would use -r, not -w.
Ref QB-95Y5NBSource: tcpdump(1) manual page (tcpdump.org/manpages/tcpdump.1.html): -i interface; -w file 'Write the raw packets to file rather than parsing and printing them out. They can later be printed with the -r option'; 'only packets for which expression is true will be dumped'Report a problem with this question
26. A SIEM search of a file server's Security log returns Event ID 4624 for a help-desk account at 03:12, with Logon Type 10 and a source address belonging to an internal workstation. What kind of logon does this record describe?
- A.Access to a shared folder over the network
- B.A logon at the server's own console keyboard
- C.A logon using credentials cached on the server
- D.A Remote Desktop session opened on the server✓ Answer
Event 4624 records a successful logon, and its Logon Type field says how the logon happened. Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) means a user logged on remotely through Terminal Services or Remote Desktop. Network share access is type 3, a console logon is type 2, and a logon with locally cached credentials is type 11. An off-hours type 10 logon from a workstation is therefore a lead for RDP-based lateral movement.
Ref QB-TMGNDDSource: Microsoft Learn, '4624(S): An account was successfully logged on' (Windows security auditing), Logon Types table: 2 Interactive, 3 Network, 10 RemoteInteractive, 11 CachedInteractiveReport a problem with this question
27. After a user opened a malicious attachment and its exploit ran, endpoint telemetry shows a backdoor being copied into the user's profile and a scheduled task created to relaunch it at every logon. No outbound connection has been seen yet. Which Cyber Kill Chain phase does this activity represent?
- A.Installation✓ Answer
- B.Exploitation
- C.Command and Control
- D.Actions on Objectives
In the Lockheed Martin model, Installation is the phase in which the adversary places a remote access trojan or backdoor on the victim system to keep persistence. The copied backdoor and the logon task do exactly that. Exploitation is the earlier moment when the attachment's code was triggered. Command and Control begins when the implant beacons out to the attacker, and Actions on Objectives is the goal itself, such as data theft.
Ref QB-A5BGTCSource: Hutchins, Cloppert & Amin, 'Intelligence-Driven Computer Network Defense Informed by Analysis of Adversary Campaigns and Intrusion Kill Chains' (Lockheed Martin white paper), Sec. 3.2 Intrusion Kill Chain: 4. Exploitation, 5. Installation, 6. Command and Control, 7. Actions on ObjectivesReport a problem with this question
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